The Trump administration is poised to impose fresh tariffs on dozens of economies this week, using a forced-labor investigation to sidestep the Supreme Court ruling that struck down its earlier trade levies, a legal workaround that could reshape global commerce before the midterm elections.
U.S. officials have drawn up options for President Trump to hit as many as 60 countries with new duties ranging from 10 to 12.5 percent, people briefed on the plans told the Financial Times. The tariffs would replace the current 10 percent global levy, which expires Friday. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, led by Jamieson Greer, ran the underlying probe and found all 60 economies had failed to adequately ban goods produced with forced labor.
The move amounts to a new legal strategy after the Supreme Court struck down Trump's "Liberation Day" reciprocal tariffs, originally announced in April 2025. Rather than rely on the emergency powers the Court rejected, the administration anchored its next round of duties to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a statute that gives the executive branch broad authority to act on unfair trade practices identified through a formal investigation.
The USTR investigation cast a wide net. Among the 60 targeted economies are Australia, Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, India, China, and Russia. Countries that maintain partial bans on forced-labor goods would face a 10 percent tariff. Those with no prohibitions at all would face 12.5 percent.
Trade officials first floated the proposal in June. The administration has already moved on individual countries outside this framework: Trump unveiled a 50 percent levy on Canadian goods and a separate 25 percent tariff on Brazilian imports.
A second, parallel investigation into excess global manufacturing capacity covers an overlapping but distinct set of nations, the EU, China, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India. The relationship between the two probes and whether the manufacturing-capacity track could produce additional tariffs remains unclear.
The administration has not moved uniformly toward confrontation. Officials recommended holding negotiations with trading partners rather than imposing tariffs following two separate investigations into critical minerals and airplane parts. They also carved out exemptions for consumer staples like beef and coffee and eased levies on steel and aluminum products.
Not everyone inside the administration favors a new tariff offensive. Two people familiar with the matter told the Financial Times that senior officials have counseled Trump to maintain stability with trading partners and honor the deals Washington struck in 2025 to lower foreign tariffs. The identities of those officials were not disclosed.
That internal tension reflects a broader debate about timing. Midterm elections loom, and the political cost of higher consumer prices is not lost on the president's advisers. The Supreme Court's recent willingness to check executive authority on multiple fronts has added legal uncertainty to the administration's trade agenda.
Wendy Cutler, a former U.S. trade official who now serves as senior vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute, framed the situation in cautious terms:
"This does not mean that tariff hikes are in the rear-view mirror. But it does suggest that a more cautious approach is now called for, particularly in the lead-up to the midterm elections."
Cutler's assessment captures the bind. The Supreme Court closed one door. The forced-labor investigation opens another, but it opens into a room full of political risk.
The legal distinction matters. Trump's original "Liberation Day" tariffs rested on emergency authorities the Supreme Court found insufficient. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 operates differently. It authorizes the president to impose tariffs after the USTR conducts a formal investigation and identifies specific unfair practices by foreign governments.
By tying new duties to a completed investigation, one that documented failures across 60 economies to ban forced-labor goods, the administration builds its case on a statutory foundation that courts have historically treated with more deference. The question is whether opponents will challenge the scope or the speed of the action.
The administration's broader pattern of clashing with the judiciary over executive authority has defined much of Trump's second term. On birthright citizenship, immigration enforcement, and now trade, the White House has repeatedly sought alternative legal pathways after courts blocked its preferred approach.
That persistence is either disciplined governance or institutional brinkmanship, depending on where you sit. But the forced-labor angle is harder for critics to attack on the merits. Few elected officials want to be seen defending foreign supply chains built on coerced labor.
The 60-country tariff plan does not exist in a vacuum. Trump has already imposed a 50 percent levy on Canadian goods, five times the baseline rate that other countries face, and a 25 percent tariff on Brazilian imports. The timing and rationale for those specific actions were not detailed in the Financial Times report.
Canada's treatment stands out. A 50 percent tariff on a close ally and top trading partner signals that the administration views trade leverage as more important than diplomatic comfort. The friction between Trump and foreign leaders has become a recurring feature of his trade posture, and allies have not been spared.
Brazil's 25 percent rate, while lower, still marks a significant escalation with Latin America's largest economy. Neither country appeared on the separate manufacturing-capacity investigation list, suggesting the administration is running multiple trade tracks simultaneously with different legal justifications.
The 10 percent global tariff regime Washington adopted after the Supreme Court ruling expires Friday. Without action, the administration loses its baseline trade leverage entirely. That deadline explains the urgency, and the willingness to move fast on a probe that was only floated publicly a month ago.
Several questions remain unanswered. Which of the 60 economies have partial bans on forced-labor goods, and which have none? What specific deals did Washington strike in 2025, and with which partners? How will the manufacturing-capacity investigation factor into future rounds of tariffs? And will any of the targeted countries challenge the new duties in court?
The federal courts have shown no reluctance to intervene when they believe executive action exceeds its legal authority. The administration is betting that Section 301 gives it firmer ground than the emergency powers the Supreme Court already rejected.
What the administration has done is straightforward: the courts closed one path, and the White House found another. Critics can call it a workaround. Supporters can call it governing. Either way, the tariffs are coming, and this time, the legal paperwork is already on the desk.
When the Supreme Court says no, a president who takes his trade agenda seriously does not quit. He reads the statute book.
